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 
Abstract—This work proposes a global navigation satellite 
system (GNSS) spoofing detection and classification technique for 
single antenna receivers. We formulate an optimization problem 
at the baseband correlator domain by using the Least Absolute 
Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO). We model correlator 
tap outputs of the received signal to form a dictionary of triangle-
shaped functions and leverage sparse signal processing to choose a 
decomposition of shifted matching triangles from said dictionary. 
The optimal solution of this minimization problem discriminates 
the presence of a potential spoofing attack peak by observing a 
decomposition of two different code-phase values (authentic and 
spoofed) in a sparse vector output. We use a threshold to mitigate 
false alarms. Furthermore, we present a variation of the 
minimization problem by enhancing the dictionary to a higher-
resolution of shifted triangles. The proposed technique can be 
implemented as an advanced fine-acquisition monitoring tool to 
aid in the tracking loops for spoofing mitigation. In our 
experiments, we are able to distinguish authentic and spoofer 
peaks from synthetic data simulations and from a real dataset, 
namely, the Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT). The 
proposed method achieves 0.3% detection error rate (DER) for a 
spoofer attack in nominal signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) conditions 
for an authentic-over-spoofer power of 3 dB. 
 
Index Terms—Global navigation satellite systems, anti-spoofing 
technique, correlator taps, sparse techniques, spoofing 
classification, spoofing mitigation. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
LOBAL navigation satellite systems (GNSS) such as the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) [1] provide crucial 
positioning and timing for applications in the civil, commercial, 
and military domains. Recently, GNSS receivers have grown in 
popularity due to their low costs and broad applications. 
Instances of GNSS uses can be seen in financial transactions, 
phase measurement units (PMUs) in power grids, and 
emergency services [2].  
The open-access aspect of the GPS coarse acquisition (C/A) 
codes exposes the system to potential malicious attacks to 
position and timing-dependent applications. Such unintentional 
or intentional attempts are categorized as jamming and 
spoofing. While jamming attempts to disrupt or degrade GPS 
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channels by signal blocking or overpowering, a smarter and 
more hazardous spoofing attack can imitate GPS signals aiming 
to mislead the target receiver and infringe flawed position and 
timing resolutions. The vulnerability to GNSS spoofing is an 
active research area due to its impact in critical and ever-
growing GNSS-dependent applications [2]. 
 Once the target receiver is deceived into locking to 
counterfeit signals, the typical spoofing attack shifts the 
authentic code and carrier phases to alter the position, velocity, 
and timing (PVT) solutions. Typically, commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) receivers lack ability to detect spoofing attacks, 
as has been proven in [3]. Additionally, recent software-defined 
radio (SDR) platforms have demonstrated fast-prototyping for 
spoofing attack implementation and mitigation techniques that 
otherwise commercial receivers lack [4]. Literature has 
categorized the type of spoofing attacks into simplistic, 
intermediate, and advanced [5] based on the complexity of the 
spoofing device, with intermediate spoofing being the most 
cost-effective in terms of implementation. 
A. Multipath considerations 
Often, spoofing attacks can manifest as multipath (MP) [6], 
[7]. In fact, considerable research addresses the discrimination 
between spoofing and MP [7], [8], [9]. However, there are four 
overall main differences: (1) the delay profile of the authentic 
and spoofed signal combined appears to be sparse per channel, 
as opposed to MP signals which appear as a cluster of reflected 
signals with various delays referred to as delay profile [10]; (2) 
the spoofing attack occurs on all channels concurrently; (3) the 
incurred attack delays appear similar on all channels; and (4) 
such attacks can overall incur significantly more damage to the 
PVT solution, e.g., cause the user position and time estimates 
to deviate more substantially when compared to MP. Therefore, 
this work focuses on a detection and classification technique 
particularly for spoofing attacks. In the next subsection, we 
provide a literature review on anti-spoofing techniques 
including the most relevant MP techniques for the sake of 
categorization. Further, a qualitative comparison of state-of-
the-art spoofing and MP countermeasures in the baseband 
domain is provided in Section VI-B.  
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B. Spoofing countermeasures 
In recent literature, GNSS spoofing countermeasures have 
been categorized based on numerous aspects of proposed 
techniques and receiver implementation domain. In the 
following, we categorize spoofing countermeasure techniques 
and their extent based on [5], [11], [12], and [13]. Fig. 1 shows 
a categorization map where an asterisk narrows down the 
discussion in this work. 
The countermeasure techniques according to Fig. 1 fall into 
four main categories [5]: (1) single-antenna advanced signal 
processing-based methods, (2) encryption-based methods, (3) 
drift monitoring methods, and (4) signal-geometry-based or 
multi-antenna methods. Signal processing-based methods rely 
on receiver tracking loops [4], correlator outputs [6], [9], [10], 
automatic gain control (AGC) power monitoring [7], and vector 
tracking loops (VTL) [12], [14]. There are encryption-based 
signal authentication methods that are yet to be implemented in 
civilian GNSS signals [15], [16]. Drift monitoring methods 
identify unexpected variations in the positioning or timing 
solutions [17], [18], [19]. Finally, signal-geometry-based or 
multi-antenna methods rely on estimating the angle-of-arrival 
or spatial vector between authentic and counterfeit signals [20], 
[21], [22], [23], [24]. Furthermore, authors in [11] categorize 
spoofing countermeasures into baseband domain—related to 
techniques pertaining to signal acquisition and tracking in the 
physical layer [4], [6], [9], [10]—and navigation domain such 
as receiver autonomous integrity measurement (RAIM) [25]. 
The baseband domain is further sub-categorized into pre-
correlator [26], [27], correlator [28], and post-correlator [12], 
[29] domains.   
In terms of spoofing countermeasure extent, the techniques 
can be classified into three independent categories [30]: (a) 
detection, which can be also seen as a binary decision monitor 
usually based on scalar-valued output metrics [9]; (b) 
classification, which discerns patterns in the received signal 
based on the nature of the technique, e.g., a MP delay profile 
[10], auxiliary peak tracking [31], or chip-level MP delays [6]; 
and (c) mitigation, which provides correction or rejection of the 
attack [7]. Also, these categories are considered independent 
such that for example, one countermeasure technique may have 
detection, detection and mitigation, or all three.  
C. Contributions of This Paper 
This paper addresses intermediate spoofing attacks based on 
a single-receiver single-antenna advanced signal-processing 
technique with a detection and classification extent. The 
proposed method falls into the baseband correlator domain 
(see Fig. 1). This domain is critical because it precedes 
navigation, where the damage to the PVT solution is by that 
time rendered. GNSS signals are commonly processed using a 
correlation-based synchronization of received signals with 
locally generated replicas of expected signal patterns. In 
particular, an ideal correlation profile of a GPS C/A signal 
resembles a triangle function, where the triangle elements 
correspond to the correlations of the received signal with replica 
fragments generated with various time delays. The triangle peak 
corresponds to the correlation with the aligned replica. 
Spoofing signals distort the triangle profile and complicate the 
synchronization process, as the correlation profile becomes a 
superposition of several such triangles of unknown intensity. In 
addition, such distortions can be mixed with residual 
uncompensated sinusoidal modulations due to Doppler effects.  
This paper develops an automatic method for triangle-based 
decomposition of the correlation profiles and extraction of 
contributing individual components, resulting from both 
desired and spoofing signals. The proposed decomposition 
exploits an optimization problem modeling the Least Absolute 
Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) [32]. Then, the 
decomposition helps to discriminate desired and spoofing 
components via a sparse output. We characterize the correlation 
profile of the received signal using a dictionary of shifted 
triangle shapes and a sparse vector to select potential shifted 
triangles from said dictionary. The optimal solution of this 
minimization technique discerns the presence of a spoofing 
attack by observing two different code-phase values, i.e., 
authentic and spoofed peaks, in the sparse vector. In addition, 
we use a threshold to mitigate false alarms.  
Moreover, we present a variation of the minimization 
problem by enhancing the dictionary to a higher resolution of 
shifted triangles. Specifically, the higher resolution aspect 
improves the detection capability (sensitivity) such that a peak 
appearing between two discrete code-phase sampling points is 
still detected, while the correlator configuration remains 
unchanged. Finally, three concepts are presented to validate the 
techniques via Monte-Carlo simulations: (1) peak sensitivity 
response (PSR) curves, for sensitivity analysis; (2) peak 
detection error rate (DER) curves, for performance analysis; 
and (3) probability of false alarm (PFA). 
The signal processing of the proposed technique relies on 
discerning two steps occurring in the tracking loops: correlation 
and integration or so-called integrate-and-dump filter [1], and 
tracking loop discriminators and feedback filters. We 
specifically analyze the correlator taps after carrier wipe-off 
Fig. 1.  Spoofing countermeasure categorization map and potential 
countermeasure extent. 
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and before entering the discriminators and feedback loop filters. 
The method is proposed to detect a spoofing event and 
discriminate when two peaks are present. Additionally, the 
technique is not suggested as a replacement module for 
conventional GPS receivers, rather as a baseband advanced 
fine-acquisition monitoring tool that can be deployed based on 
alarm-threshold strategies, or on scheduled or other arbitrary 
times. Further, by discerning between authentic and counterfeit 
peaks, the tracking loops can intelligently decide to follow the 
authentic peak without additional complex modifications. As 
long as the COTS receiver provides correlator tap outputs, the 
proposed monitoring tool can potentially be coupled with 
additional algorithms such as auxiliary peak tracking [30], [31], 
or advanced navigation-level spoofer-detectors [17], [18], [19]. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to contribute on 
the following specific components: 
1) We specifically model spoofing as a characteristic 
sparse event, i.e., spoofing peaks appear discretely, 
and thus can be addressed via sparse techniques. 
2) The LASSO is used as an optimization technique for 
automatic peak discrimination. 
3) A high-resolution aspect is introduced to the 
discrimination process, further discussed in Section 
IV. 
4) A multi-LASSO optimization problem enhances the 
discrimination of spoofer peaks that appear between 
two discrete code-phase sampling points. 
Without losing generality, the GPS C/A code signal is used 
throughout this paper, but the proposed technique can be 
extended to other GNSS signals. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the 
signal model and spoofer overview. Section III formulates the 
problem and presents the LASSO based method. Section IV 
expands to another variation based on LASSO and formulates 
the PSR concept. Section V presents the testing methodology 
and Monte-Carlo simulations, and presents results for synthetic 
data and a real dataset. Section VI discusses related work. 
Finally, Sections VII and VIII respectively present concluding 
remarks and future work. 
II. SIGNAL MODEL AND SPOOFER OVERVIEW 
The overall function of a GPS receiver is to maintain 
continuous synchronization with visible satellite signals for 
range measurements, ephemeris data extraction, and PVT 
estimation. This synchronization is achieved in two steps: 
(coarse) acquisition to find visible satellite signals and (fine) 
tracking for regular operation [33]. 
A. Authentic signal model 
Conventional GPS receivers use tracking loops for joint fine-
tuning of the incoming signal to residual Doppler carrier 
frequency and phase offsets, and spreading code alignment. The 
phase lock loop (PLL) tracks carrier-phase alignments, and the 
delay lock loop (DLL) tracks code-phase alignments. Both 
loops achieve this by generating local carrier and code replicas, 
respectively. Discriminators and filters for both the PLL and 
DLL are used afterwards as feedback loops. An initial 
estimation of a number of received spreading code chips against 
the locally generated code replica is commonly called a code-
phase. A set of correlators in the DLL compare several phase-
shifted copies of the local code replica with the incoming signal 
for code-phase adjustments. COTS receivers typically employ 
three shifts to find the peak of the correlators, namely early, 
prompt, and late (EPL) correlators, however, advanced 
receivers with higher resolution in code-phase tracking loops 
are reported with hundred or more correlators [34]. The 
correlator spacing is typically within a 1-chip period. This 
allows code-phase synchronization with at least one replica 
with sub-chip accuracy [1], [33].  
A GPS signal seen at a single-antenna receiver front-end is 
composed of an ensemble of satellite signals (channels) and 
their corresponding interference plus noise. Without loss of 
generality, the complex-valued baseband received signal for a 
single GPS channel, l , can be modeled after RF down 
conversion as follows: 
        ljl s l l s l l s l ss mT b mT c mT e mT
        (1) 
where m  is the discrete sample index, sT  is the sampling 
period, l  is the received channel power, lb  is the modulated 
bit, lc  is the C/A spreading code,  smT  is the complex-
valued AWGN random process with variance 
2
FE , and l  and 
l  are the code and carrier phase parameters, respectively, 
which are in general time-varying. Residual frequencies 
components such as intermediate frequency and Doppler effects 
have been omitted for simplicity. The receiver generates local 
carrier-phase and code-phase replicas: 
    
ˆ
ˆ ˆ, ljl s l l s lmT c mT e
     (2) 
where lˆ  and 
ˆ
l  are the estimated parameters for the l -th 
synchronized channel. The complex-valued accumulation 
product for the k -th coherent integration for a correlator is then: 
      
 1 1
*
,
1
,
c
c
k N
l k l c s l s l s l
c m kN
x x kN T s mT mT
N

 

     (3) 
where c sN f T  is the number of samples of the coherent 
integration period T , 1/s sf T  is the sampling frequency, 
 
*
  is the complex conjugate operator, and the k -th coherent 
integration length is c skN T ,  0,1,k  .  
Considering multiple shifted code replicas (or correlator taps) 
in each channel based on the receiver hardware configuration, 
a post-correlation model for the l -th channel and the k -th 
coherent integration can be written as a function of an 
(arbitrary) discrete lag i  for the i -th correlator tap: 
     ,, , ,l k
j
l k i l k i l ky R e

   

     (4) 
where  R   is the autocorrelation function depicted as a 
triangle or peak [1], ,i l k i     , , , ,
ˆ
l k l k l k     , and 
,l k  is the coherent accumulation of residual cross-correlation 
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terms and AWGN. We define the discrete lag as ,ˆi l k i    , 
where ˆ  is the estimated code-phase value,  
 1 2i E Li d     ,  1, ,i n , is a code delay where d  
is the correlator spacing in chips, E L   is defined by the 
spacing between the earliest and latest correlators, E L d   , 
and 1E Ln d    is a fixed number of correlators in the 
receiver. As an example, a typical EPL tracking loop system 
uses 1.0E L   , 0.5d  , and 3n  ; a narrow correlator uses 
0.1E L   , 0.05d  , and 3n   [35]. Additionally, the 
modulated bit has been omitted in (4) for simplicity. 
Fig. 2 shows a conventional GPS tracking loop. For a 
comprehensive set, Fig. 2 can be expanded to in-phase and 
quadrature components of the complex-valued signals, namely 
 Il ss mT  and  
Q
sls mT , as well as for the n  phase-shifted 
correlators; otherwise, signals are considered complex-valued  
[7]. 
B.  Spoofer description 
Knowing the exact position of the target receiver antenna 
and/or having physical access to it (e.g. PMUs) allows 
intermediate spoofers to carry a so-called coherent 
superposition attack [13]. It consists of synthesizing and 
conveying a GPS-like signal to replicate authentic carrier-
phase, code-phase, and data bits, to centimeter-level accuracy 
for each visible open-access channel. Afterwards, the spoofer 
gradually increases its power so that the receiver locks to a fake 
correlation peak. Finally, the spoofer deliberately drags-off the 
correlation peak to perpetrate a PVT deviation, while 
maintaining lock during the attack. The reader is directed to [5] 
for a detailed and visual depiction of this well-known attack. 
Without the loss of generality and from this point onward, we 
omit channel index l , and coherent integration instance k . 
Then the post-correlation model for a single channel and 
integration instance under a spoofing attack now includes 
additional terms: 
 
     
 
   
ˆ
S
i A i S i
j
A i
j
S S i
y y y
R e
R e

 
   
 
  



  
 
 

  (5) 
where A  and S  are the authentic and spoofer powers, 
respectively; S  and S  are the spoofer signal code-phase and 
carrier-phase, respectively, and   now includes additional 
cross-correlation terms from the spoofer. An important 
assumption on the spoofer model for this study is a so–called 
frequency locked attack [36], where both the authentic and 
spoofer are presumed to have same residual Doppler frequency 
during the attack, and thus is neglected in (5) and onwards. 
Otherwise, a sinusoid fluctuation on the spoofer peak would be 
observed for different k  integrations that could either increase, 
degrade, or not affect the authentic peak. The magnitude of said 
post-correlation output is depicted in Fig. 3 as two 
superimposed triangle shapes or correlation peaks with aligned 
phases. The blue triangle describes the authentic peak resulting 
of a typical correlator output from a tracking loop system. The 
more correlator taps are used, the finer resolution is seen in this 
triangle-shaped output.  
III. DICTIONARY CONSTRUCTION AND LASSO-BASED 
AUTHENTICATION 
 We begin the problem formulation by assuming real-valued 
terms initially, and expanding to a comprehensive complex 
domain afterwards. Assuming a two-stage correlation process 
(before tracking loops) where carrier wipe-off occurs first, and 
code sample-wise multiplication and integration follows, we 
postulate a bank of local codes typically stored in the receiver’s 
non-volatile memory. In the following, we express such bank 
of replicas in a matrix form using n  discrete replicas with 
consecutive code-phases: 
  1, , , ,
T
i nC c c c   (6) 
where c
n NC ,    , 1, ,i s i cc mT m N  c  is the i -th  
single-period shifted local code replica in column-vector 
format; and ˆi i    . This set of replicas will be used to 
assess the alignment of individual received signals.    
Similarly, we define a high-resolution set of normalized and 
noiseless signals with p  discrete code-phases, and disregarded 
Doppler effects: 
 1, , , ,j p   S s s s   (7) 
where c
N pS , and    , 1, ,j s j cc mT m N  s  is also 
a single-period local code replica, in column-vector format; and 
ˆj j     is the signal delay. The term high-resolution 
develops from a finer-granularity of code-phases between 
consecutive js  signals. The signals js  are introduced to 
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Fig. 2.  A conventional GPS correlator for a single channel. 
 
  
   
    
   
      
Fig. 3.  A superposition of authentic and spoofed correlation triangles. 
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represent ideal received signals of various delays. The received 
signal delays might not exactly match the set of discrete delays 
represented by ic  due to channel-induced random delays, 
which requires additional attention.  Thus the higher resolution 
code-phases are defined for the received signals by the delay 
 1 2 2j p p E Lj F d F        ,  1, ,j p , along 
with a finer signal spacing p pd d F . For both code-phase 
and signal spacing, pF  is called p-factor and defines the high-
resolution factor between n  correlator taps and p  shifted code 
signals, i.e., pp nF . In particular, p n  for 1pF   will 
correspond to the same delay grid of both received and replica 
signals.  
Finally, we define a normalized real-valued dictionary of 
triangle replicas by correlating p  high-resolution code shifted 
signals with a bank of n  replicas: 
 1, , , ,j p    M CS m m m   (8) 
where n pM , is the dictionary of correlations of ideal 
received signals (with p  possible code-phases) with local 
replica signals  (with n  possible code-phases). In other words, 
the code-phase grid of the received signals is pF  times finer 
than the code-phase grid of replicas. Here, j jm Cs , is a 
triangle shape correlation output of a single-period local code 
signal, with delay j , with the bank of local replicas C . Fig. 4 
shows a visual representation of matrix M  of n  correlation taps 
and p  shifted triangles. 
 
With the defined dictionary matrix, the post-correlation 
signal can be modeled as follows: 
 
1,1 1,1 1
,1 ,
p
n n n p p
m my
y m m



   
   
    
    
    
y M 
  (9) 
where  
1ny  is the received l -th channel, k -th coherent 
integration (omitted) post-correlation model after carrier wipe-
off,      cos , 1, ,i i iy y R i n           is the i -th 
correlation tap output; ,
n p
i jm
  is the i -th correlation tap 
for the j -th signal shift, i.e.,  ,i j j im R    , and 
1p
, i.e.,  j j   , is a sparse column-index selector. 
In a normal operation of the receiver, the sparse vector   
should select one triangle replica (column) from the dictionary 
M  that best assimilates the code-phase of the received signal 
triangle y . The optimal   can thus be recovered through 
solving the following LASSO minimization problem: 
 
2
2 1
1ˆ argmin
2

 
   
 
y M

     (10) 
where   is a tuning parameter that controls the amount of 
regularization of the sparse solution [32]. The first component 
in the objective function in (10) attempts to select columns of 
the dictionary matrix to match the received signal, while the 
second term encourages a sparse solution. In a successful 
detection of a spoofer attack, two non-zero entries in the 
selector ˆ  are expected, e.g, 3ˆ  and 7ˆ  (see Fig. 3 for 
reference). It is worth noting that (10) can be reformulated into 
a small-to-moderate sized convex quadratic program, which 
can be efficiently and reliably solved. Additionally, norm-2 
regularizations were explored in (10), but norm-1 showed 
superior robustness because it promotes sparsity. 
A. In-phase and quadrature LASSO 
In a more comprehensive problem formulation and similar to 
common GPS receiver tracking loops, we approach the case for 
1ny  to account for spoofer peak carrier-phase rotations 
and complex-valued AWGN. We split the received post-
correlation vector into its in-phase and quadrature components: 
    
   
cos
sin
I Q
I I I
i i i
Q Q Q
i i i
i
y y R
y y R
    
    
 
    
    
y y y
  (11) 
Similarly, we split the selector output, i.e., 
I Qi    . 
We then expand the objective function in (10) to solve for both 
in-phase and quadrature components, either jointly or 
separately: 
 
2
2
2
,
2
1
2ˆ ˆ( , ) argmin
1
2
I Q
I I I
I Q
Q Q Q


 
   
  
   
  
y M
y M 
 
 
 
  (12) 
Finally, we obtain the magnitude of both in-phase and 
quadrature outputs: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆI Qj      (13) 
 From this point onwards, the next sections will assess the 
proposed spoofer detection method by using the magnitude of 
ˆ , as in (13). 
IV. THE MULTI-LASSO TECHNIQUE 
For a fixed set of correlator taps in a GPS receiver, the 
proposed method is able to detect peaks in a discrete grid. This 
 c
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  (prompt correlator) 
Fig. 4.  Dictionary matrix of correlation triangle replicas. 
  shifted triangles 
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restriction occurs when 1pF  , and thus p n . For example, 
if 1.0E L   , 0.1d  , and 1pF  , the discrete grid for 
detection is: 
  0.5, 0.4, ,0.0,0.1, ,0.5
T
   .  (14) 
If a detected peak’s code-phase does not fall on this grid, e.g., 
at 0.04, a peak-splitting occurrence is observed, as the peak falls 
between correlator taps 0.0 and 0.1. This can cause energy 
being split between two coefficients in ˆ  and potentially incite 
a miss-detection based on a threshold level.  
Based on this motivation, we attempt to overcome said peak-
splitting phenomena by increasing the grid resolution by setting 
1pF   and p n .  As mentioned in Section III, the high-
resolution p-factor defines a finer signal spacing in the p-
domain of the dictionary matrix, as opposed to a fixed bank of 
n  replicas coming from the configuration of the receiver. 
Overall, the p-factor increases the number of possible shifted 
triangle columns. These shifted triangles are correlation 
combinations of code replicas and signals, with code-phases 
 , 1, ,i i n   and  , 1, ,j j p  , respectively. 
Additionally, the n  correlators require no modification in the 
receiver, i.e., it can be seen as an artificial increase in grid 
resolution. To achieve this, we propose a method for the p n  
case to match the artificially generated high-resolution shifts to 
n  receiver correlator taps. Following the example in (14), 
setting 5pF   artificially increases the resolution from 0.1d   
to 0.02pd  . Now, additional peak code-phases of 
 0.04, 0.02,0.0,0.02,0.04   are found on the detection grid 
around the prompt correlator tap 0.0. 
We begin the multi-LASSO formulation by generating a 
single high-resolution dictionary matrix M  by setting 1pF   
and p n . We then proceed to split said fat matrix into pF  
individual square 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrices; this, to match the n  
correlator taps of the receiver. Each decimated matrix is built 
by de-interleaving the columns of the original fat matrix as 
follows (where MATLAB notation is used): 
    : : , 1, ,K p pK F end K F M m  . (15) 
For example, a dictionary matrix with 1.0E L   , 0.1d  , 
11n  , and 5pF  , has size 11 55 . We build five individual 
11 11  matrices from said matrix by taking columns 
 1,6,11, ,51  for 1M ,  2,7,12, ,52  for 2M , etc. Each 
individual dictionary matrix can be seen as a delayed version of 
a square matrix for 1pF   and n p , delayed by pd . We then 
implement a multi-LASSO technique by adjusting (12) to 
include each KM  jointly in the 1 -minimization function  as 
follows: 
 
1 1
1 1
2
2 1
1 1
, 2
2 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ( , )
1
2
argmin
1
2
p p
p p
QI p p
K F K Fp p
QI
K F K F
F F
I I I
K K K K
K K
F F
Q QQ
K KK K
K K


 
 
 
 

 
  
  
 
 
   
  
 
 
y M
y M
 
 
 
 
 
 (16) 
Similar to (13), we combine each in-phase and quadrature 
outputs to obtain  ˆ , 1, ,K pK F  magnitudes. Moreover, 
since each vector is of size n , their entries can be directly 
matched to the receiver correlator taps. Specifically, we choose 
the maximum output among all ˆK  outputs for the i -th 
correlator tap: 
  
1 ,
,max 1, , ,
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆarg max , , , ,
p
K F ip
i i K i F i

   

   (17) 
 After finding the maximum peak for taps  1, ,i n  from 
all ˆK  vectors, we obtain 
1
max
ˆ n . The optimization 
technique deals with individual square matrices of size n n  
per LASSO computation, thus making the solution numerically 
more robust. Additionally, the objective function can be 
computed individually and not necessarily jointly, but our 
simulations show that joint computation is faster. 
A. Peak-sensitivity response 
To assess the sensitivity of our optimization technique for 
different configurations, that is, different p-factors, we utilize a 
similar concept of the impulse response in a low-pass filter; we 
name it peak-sensitivity response (PSR). First, we generate a 
synthetic signal with authentic and spoofer peaks as the input: 
  ,Aj Sj A Aj S Sjy     C s s    (18) 
where Aj  and Sj  for  1, ,j p  are indices corresponding 
to the authentic and spoofed signals selected from matrix S  in 
(7), A  and S  are the respective power levels, and   is 
complex-valued noise with power level  . Additionally, the 
spoofer phase is neglected. We use (18) as input to the proposed 
method and we evaluate a single correlator tap, e.g.,  ˆ 0.3  for 
code-phase 0.3, as the output response. We “swing” a spoofer 
peak with fixed nominal carrier-to-noise ratio (CNR) through a 
high-granularity grid, i.e.,  , 1, ,Sj j ps , as a stimulus (or 
impulse) to generate the PSR plot for said correlator tap index. 
Next, we fix the authentic peak at the center, i.e., 
, / 2Aj j p   s . We assess the PSR of our system with the 
following configuration: 1.0E L   , 0.1d  , 11n  , sf  at 25 
MHz, and a spoofer peak relative-to-authentic power of 0 dB. 
This implies a power-matching scenario. A granularity of 
0.01pd   chip is used for the grid of code-phases and a strong 
signal with CNR of 50 dB-Hz and 20 msec coherent integration 
length is simulated to test sensitivity in nominal conditions [1].  
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Fig. 5 shows a PSR evaluation for 1pF  , 3pF  , and 
5pF   with the proposed technique in  (12), and multi-LASSO 
technique in (16), for the correlator tap 0.3 (top) and tap -0.1 
(bottom). The y-axis corresponds to the magnitude of the output 
as in (13), and the x-axis is the simulated spoofer delay, j . 
Similar to a discrete Fourier transform analysis, we evaluate a 
detection bandwidth from the PSR plot by observing the output 
of the optimization technique at the fixed correlator tap, i.e., 
 ˆ 0.3 . On the top curve, the observed detection bandwidth 
for 1pF   at magnitude 0.7 is approximately 0.05. This 
translates to a sensitivity gap between neighbor correlator taps. 
On the other hand, a steeper curve and improved detection 
bandwidth is observed for 1pF   methods. This bandwidth 
corresponds to the size of the correlator spacing d  and 
translates to almost non-existent sensitivity gaps due to the 
increased granularity. Similar to an impulse response through a 
low-pass filter, the detection bandwidth becomes flatter and the 
PSR response achieves a steeper slope (roll-off factor) for 
1pF  . 
Similarly, the bottom graph of Fig. 5 shows the PSR at 
 ˆ 0.1  , where the observed correlator tap is next to the 
authentic peak tap at 0.0. For the case of 5pF  , a sensitivity 
of up to -0.02 code-phase at a magnitude of 0.7 is discernible 
from the detection bandwidth before reaching the 0.0 tap. This 
translates to a potential decomposition of the spoofer peak as 
close as 0.02 chips to the authentic peak, with this 
configuration. Additionally, a magnitude increase is observed 
at the output of  ˆ 0.1   (bottom of Fig. 5) from the LASSO 
numerical outputs. This is due to a potential energy absorption 
between both peaks and actually aids in the sensitivity for 
1pF   near the prompt tap. 
 
V.  SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 
In this section, we perform a comprehensive set of tests that 
verify the proposed model in (12) and (16) for detection of a 
spoofer attack in the received post-correlation vector y . We 
test the proposed model on two different scenarios: synthetic 
generated GPS-like signals, and a real dataset. For both 
scenarios, we assess the selector output for two dictionary 
matrices: (1) p n , for single-LASSO; and (2) p n , for multi-
LASSO. 
We evaluate our optimization technique using the 
MATLAB-based convex-optimization solver CVX [37] along 
with synthetic data. We use standard cross-validation (CV) 
methods to tune the parameter   for the simulations.  
First, a synthetic simulation is presented to demonstrate the 
advantage of using a 𝑝-factor greater than one. Then, a series of 
Monte Carlo simulations are run to characterize the DER in 
various scenarios. Additionally, we assess the effects of 
coherent integration length for enhanced CNR. To discern 
between noisy peaks and the authentic and spoofer peak 
locations, we run simulations to evaluate the PFA. Finally, the 
developed model is tested on data from the Texas Spoofing Test 
Battery (TEXBAT) [36]. 
A. A synthetic simulation for multi-LASSO 
We begin the evaluation with a visual instance. Fig. 6 shows 
a synthetic simulation of a received signal by using (18). We 
simulate an authentic peak with code-phase of 0.0, and a 
spoofer peak at -3 dB relative-to-the-authentic power with a 
code-phase of 0.34. The correlator parameters used are 
1.0E L   , 0.1d  , 11n  . We evaluate for both 1pF   and 
5pF  . A sampling rate of 25 MHz and a CNR of 50 dB-Hz is 
used. We have chosen this CNR as a nominal value measured 
in a well-known real dataset from TEXBAT [36]. On the left y-
axis, the synthetic received signal post-correlation y  is seen as 
the blue triangle, and on the right y-axis we have ˆ  outputs 
(please note y-axis ranges). The x-axis shows the correlator tap 
Fig. 5.  PSR plot for proposed technique for spoofer peak sensitivity with p-
factor of 1, 3, and 5, for correlator tap 0.3 (top), and correlator tap -0.1 
(bottom). 
Detection bandwidth 
at 0.7 magnitude for 
p-factor 1 
Fig. 6.  Normalized received post-correlation vector  with simulated code-
phase of 0.34, and CNR of 50 dB-Hz.  Proposed method output with p-factor 
of 1 (top), vs multi-LASSO output with p-factor of 5 (bottom). 
Peak @ 
0.34 chip 
Threshold 
Threshold 
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outputs. The top graph of Fig. 6 shows a split of 0.3 and 0.4 
chips near the spoofer code-phase location due to its coarse 
grid. The transversal dotted red line shows a threshold level of 
30%, or -10.5 dB of the normalized authentic signal power. This 
means that a spoofed-over-authentic peak power level at less 
than -10.5 dB will remain undetected. The threshold level is 
calculated from the normalized power. The threshold will be 
further discussed in Section V-C. Furthermore, this result 
shows the peak-splitting phenomenon discussed in Section IV. 
Due to this, the peak detection at phase 0.3 for 1pF   (top) is 
under the threshold line. The bottom graph of Fig. 6 shows the 
case for 5pF   with the multi-LASSO technique, where the 
interleaved magnitude outputs of ˆK  are plotted with red bars, 
along with the maximized output maxˆ  in yellow. Due to the 
higher-resolution in the grid, the simulated code-phase of 0.34 
is clearly detected and afterwards translated to the correlator tap 
of phase 0.3, where this peak is now above the threshold level, 
at a value of 0.42 relative to the receiver power. 
B. Monte-Carlo simulation setup 
We assess the model by generating synthetic complex-valued 
GPS-like signals with AWGN. We use Monte-Carlo 
simulations for a fixed CNR level assimilating nominal GPS 
conditions as in [36]. Our technique is evaluated on frequency-
locked spoofing attacks, thus the carrier frequency for both 
authentic and spoofed peaks is neglected. Similarly, the spoofer 
phase S  is neglected. Table 1 lists the simulation parameters 
for signal generation, correlators’ configuration, dictionary 
matrix sizes, and proposed method for the next results. 
A DER metric is used to account for detected peaks in the 
simulations. In terms of detection, the two peaks with the 
highest values in the sparse vector output are selected as peak 
candidates, i.e., authentic and spoofed. Authentic and spoofer 
peaks at known delays are generated as in (18). If the proposed 
method is unable to detect the spoofer peak at the same delay, 
it is considered a detection error. For power levels, three levels 
are used in terms of the spoofed-over-authentic signal power, in 
dB. For simulation scenarios, a worst-case scenario would be 
an authentic-over-spoofer signal power of 6 dB, and one msec 
integration length, where the spoofer is the lowest in power, 
thus hardest to detect with low CNR levels. For threshold level, 
a conservative 30% obtained heuristically is used. More details 
on the threshold are included in Section IV-C. 
C. Simulation results 
Fig. 7 depicts the DER vs code-phase i . For this result, we 
simulate a spoofer delay ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 chips in a 
granularity of 0.1pd   chips and run 1000 Monte-Carlo 
simulations per delay, while the authentic peak is always at 0.0 
chips. We use an integration length of 1-msec to highlight the 
gains of multi-LASSO over single-LASSO ( 1pF  ). For the 
worst-case scenario of authentic-over-spoofer power of 6 dB, 
the multi-LASSO 5pF   technique is able to maintain a DER 
of 7.7% averaged over all taps, when compared to an average 
DER of 16.1% for 1pF  . This shows more than two-fold gain. 
For authentic-over-spoofer power of 3 dB, the two techniques 
see an average DER of 1% and 0.9%, for single and multi-
LASSO, respectively. At authentic-over-spoofer power of 0 dB, 
the DER was essentially zero for all delays. Overall, the average 
DER of the proposed techniques over all spoofer power levels 
and discrete delays is 5.7% and 2.9%, for 1pF   and 5pF  , 
respectively. 
Similar to a BER curve, we compare the DER against 
different integration lengths of the received signal. The higher 
the integration length, the better quality of the signal as the CNR 
is improved with 20 periods of the 1-msec navigation bit [1]. 
Fig. 8 shows DER vs. coherent integration lengths of 1, 5, 10, 
15, and 20 msec. For each coherent integration length and 
scenario, we run 1500 Monte-Carlo iterations in randomly 
placed spoofer peak on a grid with resolution of 0.01pd   
chips. The authentic peak was placed at tap 0.0. We use the 
heuristically obtained threshold of 30%. The major gain can be 
seen for the spoofer relative power of -6 dB when 5pF   is 
used.  An average gain of 15.7% DER is seen in such case, for 
TABLE I 
SYNTHETIC SIMULATION CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS 
Category Parameter Value 
GPS signal No. simulated peaks 2 
 
sf  (MHz) 
25 
 Nominal CNR (dB) 50 
 Authentic-over-spoofer 
power levels (dB) 
0 dB, 3 dB, 6 dB 
 Coherent integration 
lengths (msec) 
1, 5, 10, 15,  20 
 
S  
Neglected 
 Frequency lock Yes 
Correlators 
E L   (chips) 
1.0 
 d  (chips) 0.1 
Dictionary matrix 
pF   
1, 5 
 n  (correlators) 11 
 p  (code-phase delays) 11, 55 
 
pd   
0.1, 0.01 
Proposed technique Threshold 30% 
   0.3009 
 
Fig. 7.  Simulation results DER vs different spoofer code-phases  
from 0.1 to 1.0 chips with CNR of 50 dB-Hz and 1 msec integration length. 
Avg. DER 16.1% 
Avg. DER 7.7% 
C/N0 = 50 dB-Hz 
1 msec int. 
Avg. DER 1% 
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all integration lengths. For the higher relative spoofer power 
scenario, i.e., -3 dB, 0.3% DER at 20 msec integration length is 
seen for both 1pF   and 5pF  . Again, at authentic-over-
spoofer power of 0 dB,  the DER is essentially zero for all 
integration lengths. 
To evaluate the impact of the heuristically obtained 
threshold, the PFA is assessed. A single authentic peak with 
nominal noise levels is simulated as we modify the threshold 
levels from 10 percent to 50 percent. A false alarm event is 
defined when a spoofer peak is wrongly detected. The worst-
case scenario with an authentic-over-spoofer power of 6 dB and 
1 msec integration length is assessed to estimate the PFA and 
DER. Fig. 9 shows results for threshold levels 10, 20, 30, 40, 
and 50 percent. Similarly to the results in Fig. 8, each threshold 
level was simulated with 1000 Monte-Carlo iterations and a 
randomly placed spoofer peak on a grid with resolution of 
0.01pd   chips. For the PFA results, only the authentic peak 
centered at tap 0.0 is simulated to assess false alarm detection 
peaks confused with noise (that is, no spoofer is present). The 
multi-LASSO technique shows overall better DER for several 
threshold levels at the cost of higher PFA. This is due to a higher 
sensitivity for detection. We recommend that the proposed 
techniques be used as monitoring tools in stages as to avoid high 
rate of false alarms. One can use single-LASSO optimization for 
an initial detection in nominal conditions, and multi-LASSO can 
be used as a secondary stage afterwards, to detect the spoofer 
peak location with a higher granularity. 
D. Test with a real dataset 
In this subsection, the proposed model is verified with a real 
dataset on a configurable SDR receiver [4], [38]. The real 
dataset is TEXBAT, a collection of spoofing scenarios 
generated at the University of Texas Radionavigation 
Laboratory [36]. Scenario DS2 is selected, which represents a 
static example with an intermediate spoofing attack using a 
real-time SDR device on the target antenna [3]. The spoofer 
attack alters the receiver clock bias by hijacking and gradually 
dragging-off all channels, perpetrating their code-phases 
simultaneously. For this scenario, the final code-phase drag-off 
is around 2.1 chips, which corresponds to approximately ~610 
m bias on the receiver clock. The attack begins at 100t  s and 
as it drags-off, it gradually overpowers the authentic signal by 
10 dB. Fig. 10 shows the attack in terms of code-phase 
difference, i.e., ˆS   , for channel PRN23. This graph was 
generated using an SDR GPS receiver [38] from the Software 
Communications and Navigation Systems (SCNS) Laboratory 
at the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA). The spoofer 
peak starts dragging-off noticeably at 161t  seconds by 0.2 
code-phase (see Fig. 10 bottom for a zoomed-in version). Thus, 
we use snapshots of the received signal based on these attack 
estimates to find the spoofer peak at code-phase discrete values 
of 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5, using the proposed algorithm. 
The SDR receiver for testing is able to operate in offline 
mode to process the dataset and extract software configurable 
correlator outputs [38]. TEXBAT signals were recorded with 
high fidelity equipment from National Instruments at 25 MHz 
sampling rate, and 16-bit sample resolution in interleaved in-
phase and quadrature format. We configured the receiver with 
said parameters. Since conventional GPS receivers operate on 
the 1.0 chip range, we configure the correlators slightly above 
Fig. 8.  Simulation results DER vs coherent integration length with CNR of 
50 dB-Hz. 
Avg. DER 24.7% 
Avg. DER 9% 
DER 0.3% 
C/N
0
 = 50 dB-Hz 
Threshold @ 30% 
Fig. 9.  Simulation results DER vs threshold vs PFA for worst-case spoofer 
relative power of -6 dB and 1-msec integration length. 
C/N
0
 = 50 dB-Hz 
1 msec int. 
Fig. 10.  TEXBAT DS2 spoofer attack difference on code-phase vs 
authentic (top), zoomed-in around 0.5 code-phase (bottom), with markings 
at code-phases 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5, respectively. 
t = 161s 
t = 171s 
t = 178s 
t = 184s  
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this chip range for visual demonstration. We configure the 
correlators as follows: 1.6E L   , 0.1d  , and 17n  . We 
use the multi-LASSO technique with 5pF  . We collect the 
correlator outputs from the SDR and apply the optimization 
technique on snapshots at 161t s , 171t s , 178t s , and 
184t s , corresponding to estimated attack code-phases 0.2, 
0.3, 0.4, and 0.5 chips, respectively (see Fig. 10 bottom). We 
also use an integration length of 1 msec. Fig. 11 depicts the 
results for these scenarios where the proposed technique is able 
to discern between both peaks at the estimated attack taps. We 
use a threshold of 30% as in our synthetic simulations. 
Working with real data introduces interesting phenomena 
near the vicinity of the center peak. This can be seen as a DLL 
discriminator residual, since the main peak typically shows 
visible red bars (see Fig. 11 at 171t s ). In this time slot, the 
main peak is found at 0.06 code-phase and is mapped to tap 0.1. 
Additionally, the selector might find several peak candidates 
near the center as multipath. Even though our proposed 
technique is aimed for spoofer detection, it can potentially be 
used as a DLL discriminator and multipath detector. 
VI. RELATED WORK 
This section provides an overview of the state-of-the-art in 
countermeasures against both spoofing and MP. By keeping in 
mind the distinction of spoofing from MP (see Section I-A), this 
discussion targets a qualitative distinction between spoofing 
and MP techniques. As discussed in Section I-C, the proposed 
technique falls under the advanced signal-processing category. 
Thus, the baseband domain of such category is considered in 
this section. Table 2 lists countermeasure techniques based on 
their baseband subcategory, countermeasure extent, whether 
they apply to spoofing or MP, complexity, and whether these 
techniques can be potentially implemented in a commercial 
receiver via a firmware update. 
A. Baseband domain countermeasures 
Countermeasures in the pre-correlator subcategory rely on 
RF components such as the antenna, and AGC. Authors in [27] 
achieve blind mitigation by modifying the antenna pattern to 
reject low elevation angle signals where MP might appear. 
Authors in [39] rely on AGC power monitoring to detect 
spoofing over a time window. Both methods detect and 
mitigate, but do not classify (see Section I-B for definitions). 
Also, neither method attempts to distinguish spoofing from MP. 
Correlator subcategory countermeasures such as the Edge or 
Strobe correlators adjust tap spacing to mitigate select MP 
profiles; thus, do not discern spoofing or provide a detailed MP 
delay profile [40]. Similarly, the multipath estimating delay 
lock loop (MEDLL) uses 12 correlator taps and specific metric 
computations to compensate for MP [28]. Signal quality 
monitoring techniques, namely the Vestigial Signal Defense 
(VSD) in [9], compute low-complexity scalar-valued metrics 
based on correlator peak distortions due to MP. These alarm-
based methods detect MP per channel but do not claim any 
classification or mitigation. Authors in [8] also monitor 
correlator-based metrics and further add an observation time 
window to detect a spoofer or MP. Further, authors in [7] add 
hypothesis testing to such distortion metrics to further enhance 
detection between spoofer and MP. Still, these techniques do 
not classify the spoofer, e.g., provide peak delays, or MP, e.g., 
provide the delay profile. Authors in [10] formulate complex 
MP models based on certain assumptions to classify an MP 
delay profile via the maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE). 
Similarly, authors in [41] formulate an advanced MLE adaptive 
filter based on an assumed MP model. Such techniques classify 
delay profiles based on assumed MP models at the cost of high 
complexity. Also, such MP models are limited to specific 
assumptions. Finally, only MP is modeled, thus omitting 
spoofing attacks. 
The work in [6] is more closely related to the present one. 
Specifically, the authors in [6] analyze correlator outputs using 
the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to classify peaks based on 
their chip delay. This method requires long non-coherent 
integration lengths (40 ms) and is sensitive to noise. The 
method in the present paper provides higher sensitivity with 
shorter integration lengths in similar conditions and complexity 
(see Section IV-A).  
Finally, post-correlator techniques in [29] rely on scalar 
tracking loops (STL) to evaluate the code-discriminator curve 
and compute scalar-valued distortion metrics for MP detection 
Fig. 11.  Multi-LASSO with p-factor of five on TEXBAT DS2 scenario for 
spoofer code-phases at 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5 chips, respectively. 
Threshold 
Threshold 
Threshold 
Threshold 
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and rejection. Similarly, authors in [12] use VTL outputs jointly 
for code-discriminator distortion metrics. These methods entail 
expensive receiver adaptations. 
B. Spoofing vs. multipath 
The work in the present paper (which classifies spoofing) is 
similar to MP countermeasures that are able to classify, such as 
[6] and [10]. However, unlike intermittently occurring MP, 
intentional (smart) spoofing occurs in all GPS channels at the 
same time. Spoofing attacks amount to behavior change and not 
random interference. The work in [10] models specific MP 
profiles based on particular assumptions and is able to classify 
MP, but with high complexity. Also, because MP appears 
intermittently, antenna techniques such as [27] are designed to 
blindly reject such effects, while modified correlator techniques 
as in [40] only compensate for MP errors based on specific MP 
scenarios. Rudimentary methods such as RAIM assume a single 
channel is distorted per PVT epoch, and is rejected [25]; thus, 
it will not be able to detect an all-channel spoofing attack. The 
technique in [9] relies on scalar-valued metrics that detect 
potential MP distortions of the correlation peak by setting a 
threshold and triggering an alarm when this is surpassed.  
As opposed to the previously mentioned detecting, rejecting, 
and compensating methods, the proposed technique offers a 
multi-purpose tool that detects a spoofing attack, and classifies 
the specific peak delays. Additionally, it is a contribution of this 
work to specifically model spoofing as a characteristic sparse 
event in the profile of peak delays, such that it can be estimated 
via sparse techniques. By tuning the threshold and lambda 
parameters, the proposed method can improve detection and 
classification of the attack. It is worth noting that MP is not 
necessarily a sparse event and its effect is less hazardous than a 
spoofing attack, i.e., a spoofing attack is intended to deviate the 
PVT solution substantially. As for mitigation, potential 
coupling of the proposed technique with auxiliary peak tracking 
can address this task [30], [31]. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this work, a spoofing detection and classification 
algorithm based on LASSO is proposed to discriminate 
correlation peaks from a dictionary of triangle replicas. The 
proposed method is further extended to detect a higher-
resolution grid tailored for spoofing attack delays that fall 
between two otherwise discrete points in the correlator tap grid. 
The multi-LASSO is able to detect spoofer peaks with a higher 
sensitivity without altering the receiver correlator 
configuration. 
A peak sensitivity response method is explored to test the 
sensitivity of detection and define a detection bandwidth. 
Additionally, synthetic Monte-Carlo simulations are performed 
to evaluate several aspects of the proposed technique, including 
different integration lengths and thresholds, and relevant 
metrics such as DER and PFA are assessed. The proposed 
method is able to maintain very low DER for several scenarios 
and for typical receiver configurations. The proposed method 
achieves 0.3% DER in nominal signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
conditions for an authentic-over-spoofer power of 3 dB. 
Additionally, an in-house SDR receiver from UTSA is used to 
collect correlation points from TEXBAT, a real dataset with a 
spoofing lift-off attack scenario. The proposed algorithm is able 
to detect spoofer peaks at correlator taps 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5 
from the authentic peak, respectively.  
TABLE II  
A STATE-OF-THE-ART COMPARISON OF BASEBAND DOMAIN ANTI-SPOOFING TECHNIQUES 
 
Technique Baseband 
subcategory 
Countermeasure 
extent (D/C/M) 
Applies to 
spoofing or MP?  
Complexity Firmware 
update 
Implementation aspects 
Ref. [27] Pre-correlator M MP Low No Blind mitigation by antenna pattern tuning to avoid 
low elevation angle signals. 
Ref. [39] Pre-correlator D Spoofing Low Yes Low-complexity power monitoring in a time 
observation window. 
Ref. [40] Correlator M MP Med No Correlator configuration such as spacing for select 
MP model mitigation. 
MEDLL 
[28] 
Correlator D, M MP Med No Correlators’ configuration for specific MP model. 
Requires extra correlators and high sampling rates. 
VSD [9] Correlator D MP Low Yes Distortion metrics of correlation peak. Alarm-based 
per channel. 
Ref. [7] Correlator D, M Both Med Yes Distortion sensing of correlation peak and power 
monitoring. Hypothesis testing. 
Ref. [8] Correlator D, C Both Med Yes Distortion sensing of correlation peak in time 
observation window. Hypothesis testing. 
Ref. [10]  Correlator D, C MP High Yes MLE based on MP model. Assumptions required. 
High complexity. 
Ref. [41] Correlator D, C MP High Yes Advanced MLE based on non-Gaussian MP model. 
High complexity. 
Ref. [6] Correlator D, C MP Med Yes FFT-based correlator decomposes signal into peaks. 
Requires long integration lengths. Noise-sensitive. 
Proposed 
method* 
Correlator D, C, Ma Spoofing Med Yes Advanced acquisition monitoring tool. 
Discriminates correlator peaks with high-resolution. 
Tunable. 
Ref. [29] Post-correlator D, M Spoofing Med Yes STL discriminator-based distortions metrics. Alarm-
based per channel. 
Ref. [12]  Post-correlator D, M MP High No VTL discriminator-based distortions metrics. 
Alarm-based on all channels jointly. 
aThis method can potential implement mitigation techniques such as [31] based on smart time-based analysis of spoofer peak events. 
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VIII. FUTURE WORK 
In future work, real-time implementation of the proposed 
method is anticipated. Dynamic aspects of the implementation 
such as tuning of   based on receiver characteristics and noise 
levels among other aspects, are to be explored. Additionally, 
further examination of false alarm events and added smartness 
is anticipated to further enhance the proposed method. Further 
expansion to other GNSS signals is also proposed. Several 
computationally efficient algorithms for solving LASSO, such 
as quadratic programing (QP), the alternating direction method 
of multipliers (ADMM), [42], and least angle regression 
(LARS) [43] will be thoroughly reviewed in terms of 
computational requirements and compared towards possible 
real-time implementation. Finally, we will assess the developed 
signal model in terms of multipath effects and its potential 
applicability. 
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